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SHPBL agent evidence series

Agent Action Evidence Ledger

An append-only, hash-linked evidence ledger for agent actions, verifiable from the exported file alone.

Status
Merged into the Exchange
Licence
MIT · zero runtime dependencies
Evidence
60 tests · 158 assertions

The problem

What did the agent claim it did, and was that history altered?

After an agent-driven change goes wrong, the reconstruction usually depends on chat logs and tool transcripts that nobody can prove were not edited — and they live in the same storage as the party under review.

What it does

Each recorded action — a proposal, an execution, a redaction or a later annotation — becomes an entry chained to the one before it. Any range can be exported as a self-contained document and verified from its own bytes, with no access to the original store. Redaction is a recorded event rather than a deletion, so removing a sensitive value neither breaks the chain nor erases the fact that something was removed.

How it works

Entries are canonicalized deterministically and hashed with SHA-256 via Web Crypto; verification is a pure function of the exported bytes, which is what makes third-party checking possible. Storage is a caller-provided sink, so the ledger lives wherever the operator already keeps evidence. A rejected durable append leaves the chain head unchanged and consumes no sequence number.

Tool surface

MCP over stdio. Compatible with Claude Code, Claude Desktop and Cursor, or usable directly as a TypeScript library. No API key, account or Tenable product is required.

  • record_action

    Record one agent action — proposal, execution, redaction or annotation — as the next chained entry.

  • export_ledger

    Export a self-contained, verifiable range of the ledger.

  • verify_ledger

    Verify an exported document using only its own bytes; no live store is consulted.

  • describe_policy

    Publish the redaction allowlist, hash algorithm, canonicalization and export versions, clock-skew bound and size limits.

What it deliberately does not do

  • It never prevents, approves or executes an action — it observes and attests.
  • A hash chain proves internal consistency; it does not prove when an entry was written without external anchoring, which is reported separately from chain validity.

Provenance

Where this came from

SHPBL discovered and composed this product from capability intent across its library and CMPSBL, a sister project by the same developer. The implementation was written fresh from its published behaviour specification, cleared an exact-file review of its release surface, and received its own MIT grant over that reviewed file set. The MIT grant covers only the named files in that one repository; it does not relicense SHPBL, CMPSBL, private harvest machinery, harvested bodies or provenance maps.

SHA-256 · c227f8e2022dc73454cf96447b6efff6e8f780bac690bef2d2f40e36f0c0fe7b

A merged Exchange listing is a contributed-tier inclusion. It is not certification, approval or endorsement by Tenable.